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Unraveling the Chinese Oil Puzzle 
I. Introduction 
As oil prices rose in 2004, a large part of the blame was laid at the feet of the emerging 
colossus of the East.  Newspaper stories wrote of the, “surging,” and, “insatiable demand,” 
coming from China, describing it as the, “engine of oil demand growth,”1 and explaining the 
change, "More than a billion Chinese are joining the oil market…. How can prices go down?”2  
There were moderately dissenting voices, e.g., from a professional at the International Energy 
Agency, "It is neither fair nor accurate to blame China for most of the rise in oil prices.3
 The measured increases in China’s international oil imports are based on international 
data and are quite real and not related to the probable overestimates of China’s overall rate of 
economic expansion.  The very high growth rates of Chinese oil imports in 2004 and previous 
years are shown in Table 1.  The implied growth rates are so high as to be almost unbelievable.  
From the fourth quarter of 2003 to the third quarter of 2004, there was a 30 per cent increase in 
crude oil imports.  Such a high growth rate is not the way economies, in general, actually behave 
or, in particular, the manner in which the Chinese economy has functioned in the past, even in 
the course of its remarkable expansion.  Yet the growth is real, so how can it be explained?  That 
is the puzzle! 
 
 
                                                 
1 Klaus Rehaag, (Head, Oil Industry & Markets Division, International Energy Agency, Paris, 
France), “Nailing Jelly To a Tree,” USB Workshop, Hong Kong, 22-23 September, 2004. 
2 Quoted in Time Asia, http://www.time.com/time/asia/magazine/article/0,13673,501041025-
725174,00.html. 
3 Quoted in Time Asia, http://www.time.com/time/asia/magazine/article/0,13673,501041025-
725174,00.html. 
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II. Unraveling the puzzle 
Table 1 also provides the first hint as to how to unravel the puzzle.  Crude oil imports 
have grown at extraordinary rates.  While extensive new storage facilities are being constructed 
in China, they are not as yet adequate to contain even a substantial portion of those increased 
imports, which must have been feedstock for refinery production of products.  Now notice that 
the fastest rate of increase in the products and feedstock group has been in gasoil/diesel and 
heavy fuel oil which are, to some extent, substitutable.  By comparison, as shown in the table, 
gasoline imports actually declined.   
     Table 14      
    China Crude & Product Trade    
    (thousand barrels per day)     
                    
Latest Month 
(Sept.,’04)vs 
Net 
Imports/(Exports) 
of: 2002 2003 4Q03 1Q04 2Q04 3Q04 4-Jul
Aug 
04 
Sept-
04
Aug 
-04
Sept.- 
03
Crude Oil 1247 1664 1716 2290 2371 2232 2185 2106 2413 307 202
Products & 
Feedstock 361 442 445 600 849 544 621 429 582 153 14
Gasoil/Diesel -16 -28 -9 22 50 21 29 2 32 30 86
Gasoline -142 -175 -151 -95 -141 -146 -122 -178 -138 40 77
Heavy Fuel Oil 281 407 361 448 653 412 446 424 364 -60 -183
LPG 197 202 203 172 227 222 249 164 255 90 44
Naphtha -16 -22 -24 -21 -11 -48 -39 -57 -48 8 -19
Jet & Kerosene 9 1 -6 21 15 19 2 5 53 48 17
Other 48 58 70 54 56 63 56 69 64 -5 -8
Total 1609 2106 2161 2890 3220 2776 2806 2535 2994 460 216
    
 
Table 2 adds information about domestic production.  The highest rate of growth has 
been in the production of diesel fuel.  But what lies behind the growth in diesel and fuel oil 
imports?  It is unlikely to be the increase in the output of China’s oil fired electricity generating 
plants.  Those plants account for only 3.5 per cent of China’s electric power capacity 
                                                 
4 International Energy Agency, Monthly Oil Report, 10 November, 2004, p. 14. 
 3
 
             Table 2   
                  Fossil fuel production, 2994  
      
Growth over 2003 (per 
cent) 
Item Unit 
Jan.-
Sept.,2004
Sept.,20
04 
Jan.--
Sept. Sept. 
Coal 10  '000 tons 114339.4 13406.0 15.8 20.4 
Crude oil 1000 barrels 3218.4 362.5 3.0 5.7 
Refined crude 
oil 1000 barrels 4986.5 556.1 15.4 7.3 
Gasoline 1000 barrels 1130.1 432.7 11.6 5.5 
Kerosene 1000 barrels 185.0 86.6 14.4 7.0 
Diesel fuel 1000 barrels 1869.3 842.9 20.3 15.5 
Lubricating oil 1000 barrels 84.1 7.5 17.1 -2.4 
Fuel oil 1000 barrels 376.7 36.2 11.1 0.2 
Natural-gas 
100 million 
cubic metres 294.0 32.4 17.6 18.1 
 
and that capacity must have been nearly fully utilized in the currently reported overall electric 
power shortage.  Oil fired generating capacity has, moreover, been expanding slowly, if at all, as 
nearly all new capacity has been in coal fired plants.  Nor have the diesel oil and fuel oil imports 
been replacing domestic production.  As shown in Table 2, domestic production increased by 
20.3 per cent from January to September. It is possible that some electric power plants can 
switch from coal to oil and that this type of substitution is responsible for some of the increase in 
fuel and diesel oil imports.  It is also possible that some of the imports have gone into storage.  
Yet, while China is building oil storage capacity, relatively little of that seems to have come on 
line this year.   
Tables 1 and 2 indicate that the large increases in crude imports were not, as commonly 
assumed, mainly to increase domestic production of gasoline.  Such production increased at only 
slightly more than half the rate of increase in domestic diesel production. This indicates that the 
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rapid growth in the automobile fleet in China, which has received a lot of attention, is not the 
cause of the overall high growth rate of Chinese oil imports. 
The first piece of the puzzle is the widely reported shortage of electric power.  Some of 
the published numbers do not confirm this, but the, “anecdotal,” comments are overwhelming.  
Official data indicate a roughly 15 per cent increase in electricity production in 2004, through  
November.5  If  overall GDP continued its 9 per cent growth of 2003 in 2004, that would indicate 
an electricity production/GDP elasticity of 1.67, which would be substantially higher than in 
recent years and would suggest that there is no overall electric power shortage.  In spite of these 
numbers, the People’s Daily wrote, “In the coming third quarter this year, the country will be 
short of around 30 million kw of electricity, said sources with the China Electricity Council.”6  
This Council, an official body, has issued other statements confirming the shortage mainly in the 
eastern and southern provinces.7  
  There is other evidence which is more than, “anecdotal,” and which is overwhelming.  
There have been frequent announcements of electric power rationing to entire cities as well as to 
individual manufacturing plants and shops.   There have also been with frequent, often  
unannounced outages, with the greatest shortages apparently in South China. For example, in 
December of last year the China Daily wrote, “Residents of southern Chinese city of Changsha 
spend one day of every four without power. Coal is growing scarcer.8  Perhaps the official 
estimates of electric power production are wrong. 
                                                 
5             All China Marketing Research Co.,Ltd. 
 
6  “China speeds up grid construction to ease severe power shortage,” People’s Daily, June 
7,2004. 
 
7  People’s Daily Online, February 25, 2004. 
8  “Power Shortages Darken Southern China,” China Daily, December 14,2003.. 
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 There are several possible reasons for what appears to have been a shortage of centrally 
generated electric power.  First, coal production to fire the generating stations may have not been 
adequate for the high level of usage, as suggested by the quotation above.  Again, however, the 
official statistics report a 16 per cent increase in coal production through September.  Second, 
there have been reports of bottlenecks in the rail transport necessary to bring coal to the 
generating stations.  Third, there seems also to have been inadequate generating capacity.  
Fourth, there have been many complaints of inadequate transmission line capacity.  And, fifth, 
the artificially low oil and electricity prices have done little to restrain demand. With the data 
currently available, it is not possible to allocate the blame between these five constraints.  It is 
possible that accurate estimates of generating capacity are not available even to the central 
electric power authorities.  There are complaints that, “unauthorized,” generating plants have 
been constructed with provincial or even local support or tolerance.  Accurate estimates of their 
total capacity may not even exist.  Likewise the electric power grids are, to some extent, 
localized and not capable of transmitting power from possible excess areas to the areas with 
deficits in supply. 
 While the reasons remain cloudy, the power shortages must be counted as real and as a 
significant economic mistake.  Did the central and provincial authorities simply underestimate 
the growth in demand at the prevailing prices?  Were the consequences of having power rates 
that were often subsidized taken into account?  Or were the mistakes all on the supply side, in 
providing coal and rail transport capacity and/or generating and transmission line capacity?  
Were there overoptimistic expectations of the expansion of privately financed power stations? 
The second piece of the puzzle is in the sharply increased production and use of small 
diesel/electric generators. The increased gasoil/diesel and fuel oil imports seem almost certainly 
to have fueled these generators that have been installed quite widely to provide electric power 
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that could not be obtained from the electricity grids and power plants.  There is abundant 
anecdotal and partial statistical evidence for this.9  The quotation just above goes on to state, 
“Electric heaters have been banned and sales of generators have quadrupled.”  There are 
statements such as, “During dark days, scores of the boxy, roaring contraptions are set out on the 
sidewalks in front of small shops.”10  And Mitsubishi Heavy Industries reported, “The plant has 
also seen growth in orders for its generator sets, due to the shortage of electricity supply in 
China.”11  The last phrase in the quotation bears out the previous explanation. There have even 
been recent suspensions of local limits on noise and emissions, because of the need for these 
small scale sources of electric power.12
According to Chinese data, the production of, “electric power generating equipment,” 
rose by 102 per cent from January to September of this year, as compared to the same period last 
year.  Electric power output in the same annual comparison rose by 14.5 per cent.  So the electric 
power generating equipment was almost certainly not large turbine generators, but rather the 
smaller generators. The production of internal combustion engines rose by 22 per cent. While 
this reason for the increased fuel oil demand has been noted before, it has also seldom been 
acknowledged, even in the International Energy Agency.  
 
 
 
9 The comparable experience in India is also instructive. 
10 China Daily, Dec. 14,2003. 
11 http://www.americasgenerators.com/gensetblog/2004_07.html
12 A simple calculation supports the explanation.  A small 20 kw diesel electric generator running 
16 hours per day for 300 days per year and consuming 1 gallon of fuel per hour would use 
228.48 barrels of fuel per year.  So 5000 of these sets would use1,252,000 barrels.  This number 
is in the range of imports and domestic production of diesel fuel, taking into account that many 
diesel sets, helping to power factories were much larger, although they were probably not used 
for 16 hours on most producing days, substituting for centrally provided electricity.  Internal 
combustion engines capable of generating 320,855 kw were produced in China from January to 
September, 2004. 
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III. Consequences
Some of the effects of the missteps are obvious: disruptions in domestic electric power 
production and consumption, higher prices for the fuel and diesel oil imports and a diversion of 
manufacturing production to the small diesel/electric generators.  In addition, these small 
generators have the not inconsiderable disadvantages of being heavily polluting, as well as noisy 
and inefficient.. 
 There is, however, a bright spot in the story.  The large scale recourse to small 
diesel/electric generators to maintain the activities of manufacturing plants and individual shops 
is testimony to the ingenuity and enterprise of their owners. 
 As for the future of oil imports in China, in the near term it is expected that electricity 
production and deliveries will grow and there has already been some cutback in approvals for 
new generating stations, while transmission line construction and connection proceeds rapidly.  
These developments should decrease the demand for foreign oil.  On the other hand, as noted, 
there has been a rapid increase in the construction of oil storage facilities.  While it might be 
expected that Chinese authorities will fill those facilities at a measured pace that will not push 
the price against them by too much, they have also shown signs of deep concern for ensuring 
their future supplies.  The growth in the automobile fleet and other oil uses can be expected to 
outpace the overall economic growth rate by some percentage points.  Still, it seems plausible 
that the growth in China’s foreign oil demands will return to a pace only slightly higher than that 
of 2002 and 2003.13
 
  
                                                 
13  The Wall Street Journal of Dec. 22, 2004 (p. A11) quotes a recent Merrill Lynch report as follows: “We 
have not found any clear signs of weakening in China’s oil demand after three quarters of macro tightening.”  
However, “macro tightening,” is not the most effective way of reducing the rate of growth of China’s oil demand.  
That will depend on the rate at which electric power supply can be expanded. 
